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Industry Issue Paper
by Christian Hofer and Martin Dresner
This	paper	presents	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	current	United	States–European	Union	(U.S.–E.U.)	
aviation	relations.	Following	a	brief	historical	review,	the	proposed	North-Atlantic	Open	Aviation	
Area	is	discussed.	Specifically,	the	associated	economic	benefits	are	assessed,	and	the	causes	of	the	
current	deadlock	in	U.S.–E.U.	negotiations	are	analyzed.	Particular	attention	is	paid	to	the	interests	
and	actions	of	U.S.	stakeholders,	most	notably	U.S.	airlines,	labor	organizations,	the	Department	
of	Transportation	and	Congress.	
INTRODUCTION
The United States and the European Union are the world’s largest economies.  In 2003, the combined 
gross domestic product of the United States and European Union was nearly US$24 trillion, with 
direct investments from U.S. investors to the European Union and vice versa totaling over $1.8 
trillion (Calleja 2004). The size of the U.S. and E.U. economies, together with the historically strong 
ties between the two regions, result in the world’s largest international air transport market.  In 2000, 
419,961 billion revenue passenger kilometers were generated between North America and Europe 
(Button 2002). Aviation, thus, is an important and economically significant element in transatlantic 
relations.
While commercial exchange and trade relations have prospered due to progressive trade 
agreements, international aviation, to some extent, has lagged behind. Although a number of “open 
skies” bilateral agreements have been concluded between the U.S. and European countries, certain 
aspects of the transatlantic aviation market continue to be restricted, such as access to key airports 
(most notably, London Heathrow), fifth freedom and cabotage routes, and foreign ownership of 
airlines. 
The “Open Aviation Area” (OAA) between the United States and the European Union has been 
proposed as a way to reduce restrictions in the transatlantic aviation market, thus contributing to 
increased efficiencies, greater airline profits, lower prices, and better route choices for consumers. 
Between 2001 and 2004 alone, U.S. airlines accumulated losses of US$36 billion.1 While there 
are many reasons for the industry’s poor performance, it has been suggested that the opening 
of international aviation markets could help strengthen the aviation industry. According to the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), the liberalization of the transatlantic aviation market 
would affect approximately 105,000 seats each day and could add US$12 billion to the profits of 
American and European airlines (Bisignani 2006).  However, opposition to the Open Aviation Area 
remains strong, and talks to conclude an agreement creating the OAA are currently stalled.  This 
article sheds light on the reasons for this deadlock and evaluates the prospects for the successful 
deregulation of the U.S.–E.U. aviation market.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S.–EUROPEAN AVIATION RELATIONS
Ever since the failure of the Chicago Convention of 1944 to agree on a multilateral regulatory 
regime for international air transportation, the regulation of international air transportation has been 
governed, primarily, by a system of government-to-government bilateral agreements. The bilateral 
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system requires two governments to agree on such factors as the routes to be served between the two 
countries, the approval process for pricing by the carriers, and any fifth freedom route rights.2 The 
primary model for these bilateral agreements has been the Bermuda I bilateral, signed by the United 
States and the United Kingdom in 1946. The Bermuda I agreement specified the routes between the 
United States and the United Kingdom that could be served by the carriers of both countries, while 
limiting fifth freedom rights. Carriers were free to set capacities and determine flight frequencies 
within the limits of the agreement. Finally, carrier prices were set through the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) subject to approval by both governments.
The Bermuda I agreement was replaced in 1977 by the Bermuda II agreement, which had 
more restrictive provisions. Instead of allowing airlines to freely determine capacities and flight 
frequencies on permitted routes, the Bermuda II agreement allowed governments to determine 
capacities for the carriers. This process involved U.S. and U.K. representatives meeting on a regular 
basis to divide capacities between their respective carriers.  
Partly as a backlash to this restrictive agreement, and partly to arrive at an international policy 
that was in keeping with domestic deregulation of air transportation, the United States changed 
course with respect to international air transport bilaterals in 1978 and began to sign liberal bilateral 
agreements. These liberal agreements, which served as precursors to the open skies agreements 
of the 1990s, differed from the Bermuda I and Bermuda II agreements in a number of significant 
ways. First, they undermined the price-fixing authority of IATA by allowing individual carriers to 
set prices with minimal government oversight.  Second, they specified a much wider system of 
routes permitted between the two signatory countries, typically allowing any possible third or fourth 
freedom route.3 Third, they permitted carriers to fly extensive fifth freedom routes, subject to third 
country approval (i.e., fifth freedom routes begin or end in a third country and this third country’s 
approval is required for the route to be operated).  In five years, 1978-1982, the United States signed 
23 of these liberal (or partially liberal) agreements, several with European countries (Dresner and 
Tretheway 1992).
After a pause during the Reagan Administration, when there was comparatively little activity 
by the United States in signing liberal bilateral agreements, a number of new open skies agreements 
were signed in the 1990s. The open skies agreements were largely modeled on the liberal agreements 
of the 1970s and 1980s, including liberalized route rights and minimal government oversight over 
pricing. The signing of these open skies agreements coincided with the privatization of many flag 
carriers, leaving foreign countries more willing to allow their carriers to compete in a liberalized 
marketplace. Between 1992 and May 2006, the United States signed open skies agreements with 
76 countries, including 15 member countries of the European Union,4 although the more restrictive 
Bermuda II agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom (1977) remained in 
force.5 Other E.U. countries without open skies agreements include Greece, Ireland, and Spain.6 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF U.S.–E.U. AVIATION RELATIONS
From Open Skies to the Open Aviation Area
As a result of the open skies agreements, United States airlines enjoy largely unrestricted access 
to most transatlantic aviation markets. European airlines, in contrast, are at a distinct competitive 
disadvantage. Unlike their United States counterparts, they have permission to fly to the United 
States only from their respective home countries, and not from other countries within the European 
Union. Further deficiencies in the current regulatory regime include limitations on investments in 
foreign airlines and the prohibition on cabotage flights (Moselle et al. 2002).7
Recognizing that the fragmentation of E.U. member states puts European airlines at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to U.S. carriers, the European Commission repeatedly attempted 
to obtain an exclusive mandate to negotiate air transport agreements on behalf of the European 
Union. As the Council of the European Union declined to bestow this responsibility upon the 
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commission, the latter decided to take legal action before the European Court of Justice against 
those member states that had signed bilateral open skies agreements with the United States (Warden 
2003). The European Commission argued that the individual member states did not have authority 
to sign commercial pacts with non-E.U. nations. Moreover, the commission noted that the open 
skies agreements were in violation of European law. The latter prescribes that all E.U. firms be 
granted the right of establishment and the privilege of national treatment in all E.U. member states 
(Warden 2003). In the context of the airline industry, this implies that an Italian carrier, for example, 
is subject to the same rules and enjoys the same rights as a German airline when operating services 
between Germany and any other country.
In its 2002 ruling,8 the European Court of Justice partially voided the existing open skies 
agreements due to, most notably, their “nationality clauses” that prevent European airlines from 
operating between the United States and third countries within the E.U. Some argue this ruling 
effectively suspended all open skies agreements (Warden 2003), while others—such as the U.S. 
administration—insist that the agreements remain essentially intact. Three days after the E.U. court 
ruling, Jeffrey N. Shane, then associate deputy U.S. secretary of transportation, signaled openness 
to partial renegotiations of existing open skies agreements by noting that “the United States is 
prepared to look creatively at nationality clauses. We certainly do not treat the traditional formula 
as sacrosanct,”9 The European Commission, however, envisioned more fundamental changes and 
suggested abandoning the existing open skies agreements altogether in order to create an Open 
Aviation Area between the United States and the European Union. In June 2003, the member states 
of the European Union mandated the European Commission to conduct negotiations with the United 
States with regard to the Open Aviation Area.
The Open Aviation Area: Objectives and Potential Results
The Open Aviation Area is designed to be a comprehensive agreement between the United States and 
the European Union, governing air services between and within the two territories. The European 
Commission specifically hopes to agree on a set of rules “governing market access (routes, capacity, 
and frequency), how air fares are set, how to ensure effective application of competition rules, and 
how to ensure maintenance of high standards of airline safety and aviation security.”10 While not 
formally a part of the OAA, issues of foreign ownership and control are also included in the agenda. 
The vision is to create an economic area spanning both the United States and the European Union in 
which carriers, regardless of their country of origin, operate and cooperate freely both in domestic 
and international route markets.11 The expected results would be more competition, a greater choice 
of services, and lower fares. The total impact of the OAA on consumer surplus, for example, is 
estimated to be in the order of 3.1 to 3.8 billion Euros per year (Moselle et al. 2002).12 To understand 
the origins and drivers of these economic benefits, a review of the effects of air traffic deregulation 
in general, and in the United States–European context in particular, is provided below. A more 
technical economic analysis of air transport liberalization is provided in the Appendix.
Competition
Liberalized market access provides for greater competition.  Many research studies have shown that 
increased competition implies greater consumer choice and lower prices, all else equal (Brueckner 
2001, Morrison 2001, Windle and Dresner 1995). In a United States –European open aviation area, 
an airline from one European country could offer transatlantic services to the United States from 
another E.U. member state, thus providing additional competition. By the same token, American 
carriers could serve European markets where access may have been previously restricted.  Access 
to London’s Heathrow Airport, for example, is a priority for U.S. carriers.  To the extent that slots 
at Heathrow are made available, U.S. carriers not now serving London Heathrow from the United 
States could add that service. 
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Consolidation
It is likely that the formation of the OAA would lead to industry consolidation.  Since the bilateral 
regulatory regime would be replaced by a comprehensive U.S.–E.U. agreement, large, consolidated, 
European carriers could serve the United States from any point in the European Union.  Small 
European carriers may go out of business or be purchased by larger airlines.
Alliances, mergers, and acquisitions have proven to be powerful strategies in the aviation 
business. A study by Oum et al. (2004), for example, suggests that (horizontal) alliances in the 
airline industry result in significant productivity gains (see Button 2002 for a discussion of the 
benefits of transatlantic alliances). The profitability effect of mergers is highlighted by the cases 
of US Airways with America West Airlines, and Air France with KLM.  In both cases, the merged 
firm posted substantial profit increases following a merger (Buyck 2006, Straus 2006). By the same 
token, with fewer airlines operating in the transatlantic market, there may be price increases as 
carriers exercise their market power.
Efficiency
Efficiency gains in deregulated markets are predominantly derived from increased market and firm 
size. The U.S.–E.U. Open Aviation Area unites the world’s largest aviation markets, and, as noted 
above, large airlines or airline alliances would likely emerge as the key players in this market. Large 
firms exploit size-related economies, such as economies of scale (increased scale of operations), 
scope (increased network size) and density (increased passenger throughput) (Moselle et al. 2002, 
Oum et al. 2004). 
The increased scale of airline operations may also lead to improved customer service in terms of 
network coverage, reliability, and frequency of services (Button 2002). From an airline’s perspective, 
further productive efficiencies arise from improved access to capital markets (Moselle et al. 2002). 
U.S. airlines, for example, could benefit from foreign investments to a greater extent than current 
regulations permit,13 thus attracting urgently needed fresh capital. Moselle et al. (2002) point out 
that closer cooperation and integration between American and European carriers leads to a more 
efficient pricing regime and the elimination of double marginalization14 (see Buehler 2005, Cameron 
and Done 2006, Park and Ahn 1999 for a discussion of the effects of double marginalization in 
network industries). It is also conceivable, however, that further consolidation within the airline 
industry results in an increase in firms’ market power. Dominant airlines may then be able to exploit 
their market power and charge higher fares.
Growth
Improved operating efficiency and increased competition may result in a decrease in prices and to an 
increase in passenger traffic on liberalized air routes. Based on the markets that were liberalized in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Dresner and Tretheway (1992) showed that the discount prices in these markets 
were 35% lower than the discount prices in markets regulated by Bermuda I or II agreements and 
equated this price drop to annual welfare gains of about $325 million.15  Dresner and Tretheway 
(1992) further showed that traffic in the liberal markets was, on average, 46% greater than the traffic 
in the Bermuda markets, after controlling for all other factors.  They also calculated that the average 
passenger growth rate in the liberal markets was 11% higher than the average growth rate in the 
Bermuda markets. 
More recently, the consulting firm InterVISTAS-g2 analyzed the impact of deregulation by 
conducting a series of case studies (Anonymous 2006). Examining air traffic between the United 
States and the United Kingdom, for example, the following conclusions were presented:
“A simulation of full liberalization of the United States – United Kingdom market 
as a result of a Comprehensive First Step Air Transport Agreement between the 
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U.S. and the European Union would result in a 29 percent increase in traffic. The 
increase would derive in part from lower fares, and in part from allowing any 
U.S. city to obtain nonstop service to London’s Heathrow or Gatwick airports.” 
(Anonymous 2006,  ES-14)
The report estimates the incremental GDP impact for both the United States and the United 
Kingdom to be about of $7.8 billion.
Moselle et al. (2002) estimate direct employment effects and indirect revenue effects of air 
traffic deregulation. They project that the implementation of an open aviation area would create 
between 3,800 and 16,200 new airline and airport jobs in the United States and the European Union 
(Moselle et al. 2002, Table 6-3). The increased volume of air travel both between and within the 
United States and the European Union would result in rising demand for aircraft, parts, maintenance 
services, fuel, advertising, and computer equipment (Moselle et al. 2002). Focusing on suppliers 
of these products and services only (and thus ignoring further indirect effects on the transportation 
and tourism industries), Moselle et al. (2002) estimate that the revenue effect on directly related 
industries ranges between 3.6 and 8.1 billion Euros (Moselle et al. 2002, Table 6.4).
The Current Status of U.S.–E.U. Negotiations
Preliminary talks between the U.S. and the E.U. on the Open Aviation Area started in 2004, and several 
rounds of negotiations have taken place since then. The provisional results have been recorded in 
the text of a First-Stage Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement16 and the related Memorandum of 
Consultations. The key points of the latter include, most notably, the willingness of the United States 
to abandon the nationality clauses of previous open skies agreements and to embrace the concept 
of a “European carrier” (Waterfield 2005). Moreover, the agreement envisions an adjustment in 
the U.S. foreign ownership threshold to European levels (i.e., 49% of equity). Accordingly, the 
U.S. administration has attempted to relax its restrictive foreign ownership rules. This initiative, 
however, has sparked vociferous opposition in the U.S. Congress, by key U.S. carriers, and by labor 
organizations (Anonymous 2006, U.S. Senate 2005). The government of the United Kingdom, in 
turn, has made it clear that it will not accept any U.S.–E.U. aviation deal unless the United States 
makes concessions with respect to foreign ownership and cabotage, the right of European airlines to 
offer domestic services within the United States, and vice versa. 
With a 40% share in the E.U.–U.S. transatlantic market and the “crown jewel,” London Heathrow 
(Waterfield 2005), the United Kingdom has a particularly high stake in the ongoing negotiations and 
is likely to block any U.S.–E.U. agreement that does not provide European airlines greater access 
to the U.S. domestic market (Done 2006, Knight 2004, Sevastopulo 2004). Foreign ownership and 
cabotage, however, remain the very issues on which the United States appears unwilling and/or 
unable to compromise. As of summer 2006, U.S.–E.U. negotiations have been put on hold as “the 
U.S. has extended its internal decision-making process” (AEA 2006). 
Contentious Issues
As noted previously, the concept of a U.S.–E.U. Open Aviation Area originally envisioned a 
wholly integrated and deregulated aviation market. For various reasons (discussed below), the 
U.S. administration has ruled out granting cabotage rights to European airlines, and the topic has 
effectively been deleted from the OAA agenda (Sevastopulo 2004). The remainder of the Open 
Aviation Area has since been termed the “Trans-Atlantic Common Aviation Area” (House of Lords 
2003, Warden 2003)—a designation that more appropriately describes the regulatory realm that is 
the subject of ongoing negotiations.
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Foreign Ownership: The most contentious issue remains that of foreign ownership, which is 
also directly related to the issue of cabotage.17 European law currently allows overseas investors to 
own up to 49% of a European carrier’s equity. While the European Commission’s objective is to 
lift foreign ownership restrictions altogether, the minimum requirement is reciprocity. U.S. laws, 
however, continue to limit foreign ownership to 25% of the voting stock (and 49% of non-voting 
stock18) (Pustay 1992). The European side argues that such restrictions serve no purpose but to hinder 
competition and “the normal development of the industry” (Calleja 2004) and exclude U.S. airlines 
from foreign capital markets (Havel 2003). The European Union and the government of the United 
Kingdom, in particular, are adamant that ownership constraints be lifted to facilitate the integration 
of U.S. and European air carriers (Done 2006).19 The associated efficiency gains and resulting 
improvements in airline competitiveness are seen as key incentives for further deregulation.
While the liberal, pro-competitive, European stance is argued from an economic perspective, 
political concerns have dominated the discussion within the United States. The so-called Citizenship 
Purity Test was implemented in the 1920s (Adams 2006) and is applied to all U.S. airlines to verify 
that ownership and control remain with U.S. citizens. This rule was put into place for “reasons of 
national security” (Havel 2003) and to protect the U.S. domestic airline industry from international 
competition (hence the link to cabotage). Both rationales are reviewed below.
Security Concerns:  The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program provides the United States 
with military access to commercial aircraft in the case of “defense emergencies” (House of Lords 
2003). Under this program, U.S. commercial carriers pledge to provide transportation services to the 
military in return for exclusive access to U.S. government peacetime business (Moselle et al. 2002). 
Given the scale of the CRAF program20—commercial airlines provide 90% of military passenger 
air transportation and 40% of military cargo air transportation during military activation (Havel 
2003)—it has been argued that foreign ownership might jeopardize military operations as foreign 
owned airlines may be unable or unwilling to provide reliable transportation services in support of 
U.S. military operations (Grossman 2006). While it is true that the U.S. government has greater 
legal leverage over U.S. airlines than over foreign carriers, there is no reason to suggest that U.S. 
airlines under foreign ownership would provide less reliable service (Moselle et al. 2002).  In fact, 
the U.S. government relies on foreign-flagged ocean carriers to provide much of the country’s sealift 
capacity during wartime. 
The security concerns, however, are persistent, and proponents of foreign ownership restrictions 
insist that critical infrastructure services and installations must remain under direct control of the 
U.S. government and U.S. citizens. The experience of the “Dubai Ports deal”21 and the ensuing 
national-security debate bear testimony to the strong political weight associated with the foreign 
ownership issue (Barnard 2006, Cameron and Done 2006). 
U.S. Protectionism:  Aside from protecting national security, the United States is also concerned 
with protecting U.S. airlines and U.S. workers. U.S. airlines accumulated of about US$ 36 billion22 
between 2001 and 2004. Excess capacity, rising operating costs, and cut-throat competition have 
been blamed for the industry’s poor performance. Concerns have been voiced that a relaxation of 
foreign ownership requirements might result in further U.S. domestic capacity increases and put 
more pressure on U.S. airlines (Mazor 2006). 
The case of Virgin America has shown the resoluteness of the opposition to foreign ownership 
in the U.S. domestic aviation market.  In late 2005, Virgin America filed an application for an 
operating certificate with the U.S. Department of Transportation. While Virgin America claims to 
meet nationality requirements (i.e., no more than 25% of the voting stock and no more than 49% of 
all stock is held by foreigners), its affiliation with the British Virgin Group has been subject to close 
scrutiny by U.S. airlines and other interest groups (Lott 2005). Continental Airlines and American 
Airlines, among others, filed objections to Virgin America’s application with the Department of 
Transportation in an attempt to block the carrier’s certification. In its monthly magazine, the Air 
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) contains an article titled “Virgin Invasion” with “The British Are 
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Coming! Only this time, they’re not after your tea taxes, they want your jobs and your paying 
passengers” (Mazor 2006, 26). 
Concerns about the impact of foreign ownership on U.S. employment have been expressed 
elsewhere (Warden 2003), but independent studies have concluded that there is little evidence 
relating foreign ownership to a decline in U.S. employment (Moselle et al. 2002). As Warden (2003) 
points out, however, there may be differences and loopholes in labor laws and labor protection 
standards that may require closer examination before comprehensive aviation agreements, including 
revisited foreign ownership regulations, can be concluded.
Access to London Heathrow: A second contentious issue is access to London Heathrow.  As is 
discussed in more detail below, there are currently only two U.S. carriers (United and American) and 
two U.K. carriers (British Airways and Virgin Atlantic) that can serve the U.S. market from London 
Heathrow.  The OAA would, theoretically, open the London Heathrow–U.S. market to other U.S. 
and European carriers. However, London Heathrow is slot-restricted, and slots are not currently for 
sale.  It has been proposed that a certain percentage of slots at Heathrow that are “grandfathered” 
with existing carriers be withdrawn from these carriers and made available to other carriers through 
market sales.  Although the U.K. government is agreeable to a secondary market for Heathrow slots, 
it has not agreed to the withdrawal of slots from current holders (House of Lords 2003). Without 
access to slots at Heathrow for additional U.S. carriers, it is doubtful that the U.S. government will 
agree to the OAA.
Other Issues: Further concerns pertain primarily to third-country relations, aviation safety, and 
subsidization of airlines. As to the first issue, it is unclear how a potential U.S.–E.U. agreement 
would affect aviation relations with third parties. Would Mexico, for example, permit a French 
carrier to operate flights between Italy and Mexico with a stopover in the United States?  Provisions 
in the U.S.–Mexico bilateral agreement could allow the Mexicans to refuse these flights raising 
the fear that third countries, in general, might withdraw such traffic rights (Havel 2003). Others, 
however, have suggested that “the E.U. and U.S. jointly persuade the third country to accept the 
airline concerned irrespective of its ownership and control” (Calleja 2004). Safety concerns have 
been expressed but quickly dismissed, as both U.S. and European airlines (as well as any other 
international airline) must abide by the safety standards and procedures defined by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which, in turn, are enforced by national aviation authorities 
(Moselle et al. 2002). Subsidization, finally, remains a sensitive issue in commercial transatlantic 
relations. Government subsidies to European airlines,23 such as Air France (3.15 billion Euro since 
1991), Iberia (1.4 billion Euro), and more recently, Olympic Airways (1.1 billion Euro since 1991), 
are illegal under Article 92 of the European Community Treaty (Scharpenseel 2001). At the same 
time, European airlines have complained that many U.S. carriers drastically cut ticket prices on 
transatlantic routes following the Bush Administration’s announcement of government aid for U.S. 
airlines in 2001 (Guerrera 2001). A common understanding of the government’s role in the aviation 
industry would be required to eliminate anti-competitive subsidization practices in an open aviation 
area.
THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
The key U.S. stakeholders in aviation negotiations with the European Union are U.S. airlines, unions 
and other labor organizations, the Bush Administration and the Department of Transportation, as well 
as Congress. Their positions, interests, and actions with respect to the OAA are reviewed below.
U.S. Airlines
U.S. carriers are divided into two camps, those that support the Open Aviation Area and those 
that do not. FedEx and United Airlines are the most ardent defenders of the OAA (Meckler and 
Michaels 2006). FedEx is keen on establishing hub operations in Europe that would provide the 
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cargo carrier with greater access to markets in Europe and beyond. United Airlines, in turn, strives 
to further integrate with its European partner airlines, most notably Lufthansa. Hawaiian Airlines, 
Delta Airlines, and Atlas Air/Polar Air Cargo have also voiced support for the OAA (Anonymous 
2006, Hughes 2006). At the same time, Continental Airlines seems determined to stop any U.S.–
E.U. aviation agreement. Jeff Smisek, president and CEO of Continental, argues that “[i]f the deal 
is approved, British Airways can start flying between Heathrow and Houston with as many flights 
as it wants to, but Continental won’t be able to operate any flights between its Houston hub and 
Heathrow” (Meckler and Michaels 2006). In theory, all U.S. airlines would gain access to Heathrow, 
but it would be difficult for carriers, such as Continental and Northwest, to obtain slots without their 
reallocation by the U.K. government or through market mechanisms (Karantzavelou 2005, Meckler 
and Michaels 2006). Moreover, if the OAA materializes, some U.S. airlines may face increased 
competition on flights between the United States and Europe, possibly resulting in lower fares and 
lower market shares. Consequently, Continental Airlines has been lobbying vociferously against the 
OAA and to changes to foreign ownership rules, a likely prerequisite to the successful conclusion of 
U.S.–E.U. aviation negotiations.
Unions and Labor Organizations
Unions and labor organizations in the United States have joined Continental Airlines in efforts to 
block changes to current foreign ownership regulations. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), 
for example, fears that jobs for U.S. citizens will be eliminated (Meckler and Michaels 2006) 
at a time when “thousands of airline workers already have been laid off amid heavy losses and 
bankruptcies” (Grossman 2006). Labor unions24 are particularly concerned that the best jobs—
pilots on transatlantic flights, for example—will go to foreign workers (Adams 2006, Meckler and 
Michaels 2006). Representatives of labor organizations argue that similar experiences have occurred 
“when the U.S. maritime industry was taken over by foreign players” (Grossman 2006). In addition 
to fears of job losses for American airline personnel, the most frequently cited issue is that of labor 
laws. Duane Woerth, president of ALPA, for example, notes that representational and collective 
bargaining issues arise as “current labor laws do not deal with labor relations issues that would be 
created by transnational airline families that operate in multiple domestic markets” (Woerth 2004). 
Woerth further argues that the benefits to be derived from aviation deregulation are not well balanced 
among the United States and its partner countries. Referring to the German Open Skies Agreement, 
for example, Woerth noted that “US carriers grew their German operations […] but their growth 
paled in comparison to Lufthansa’s” (Woerth 2004). Statements such as “[ou]r country already 
has a dependence upon foreign oil. Are we going to allow the DOT to make air travel dependent 
on foreign airlines, too?” (Corsi 2006) further illustrate that the labor unions’ interests are clearly 
protectionist in nature.
The Bush Administration and the Department of Transportation
The Bush Administration, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) in particular, firmly support 
the creation of the Open Aviation Area, believing that the OAA will benefit both U.S. consumers 
and U.S. airlines (Adams 2006). Lower fares and better service in terms of carrier choice, reach, 
and frequency are considered the key advantages from a passenger perspective. At the same time, 
the OAA would enhance U.S. airline access to international routes and capital markets (Meckler 
and Michaels 2006). DOT officials argue that “the modern economy—and by extension […] 
transportation systems—are global in nature” and warn that the U.S. might “lose [its] competitive 
edge” (U.S. transportation secretary Norman Mineta in Karp 2006) if the OAA initiative fails. 
Recognizing security concerns relating to the CRAF program expressed by the Department 
of Defense, and the protectionist sentiment in the United States, the DOT has attempted to find a 
compromise by “reinterpreting” extant U.S. legislation on foreign ownership.  In November 2005, 
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the DOT issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM25) which may grant non-U.S. citizens 
greater influence over U.S. carrier operating decisions (including choice of markets, equipment, 
and pricing) while leaving more sensitive decisions pertaining to safety and security (including 
CRAF participation) under the control of U.S. citizens.26 The DOT argues that U.S. citizens would 
continue to exert “actual control” over U.S. carriers and that current foreign equity ownership limits 
would remain unchanged. It was hoped that this would partially accommodate the E.U.’s request 
for relaxed foreign ownership rules while circumventing lengthy and possibly futile law-making 
processes. Airlines, such as United, Delta, and Hawaiian, as well as U.S. aircraft manufacturer, 
Boeing, and the airport authorities of Washington D.C. and Orlando, support the DOT’s initiative 
(Anonymous 2006).
Congress: The House and the Senate
In 2003, John Mica, a Republican congressman and chairman of the United States House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Aviation noted that “it would probably take a ‘crisis’ before 
Congress would consider raising [foreign ownership levels]” (Sevastopulo 2003). In December 2005, 
Representative James Oberstar (Democrat, Minnesota), proposed a bill27 that aims at preventing the 
DOT from issuing a final decision on the NPRM. Oberstar and the bill’s 196 co-sponsors argue that 
the DOT does not have authority to interpret extant laws on foreign ownership in a way inconsistent 
with the letter of the law. In December 2005, Senator Daniel Inouye (Democrat, Hawaii) introduced 
a bill in the Senate to block the implementation of the DOT’s NPRM.28 The bill has been supported 
in committee29 and passed to the full Senate for approval. Even if these initiatives are not successful 
in blocking DOT’s proposed rulemaking changes, they do demonstrate the extent to which members 
of the U.S. Congress are opposed to allowing greater foreign control over U.S. carriers.
In his July 2006 farewell address, U.S. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta commented 
on the debate surrounding the foreign ownership issue and the related NPRM as follows:
“Security is, and must always remain, a foremost concern. But it is pure folly to 
think that economic isolationism is an option in today’s interconnected world. 
While the rest of the world is building up its infrastructure, the United States 
can ill afford to close the door on much-needed investments, even international 
investments, in our transportation network.” (U.S. Transportation Secretary 
Norman Mineta in Karp 2006).
Meanwhile, the DOT remains committed to making a final rule on the NPRM by late August 
2006. This will likely not end the foreign ownership debate, however. Meckler and Michaels (2006) 
cite a confidential report by Continental Airlines’ legal team as stating that the NPRM on foreign 
ownership is “vulnerable to judicial review and reversal and uncertainties stretching years into the 
future.” It is questionable whether the European Union will sign a U.S.–E.U. aviation agreement as 
long as this issue is not definitively solved (Hughes 2006).
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In 2002, the European Court of Justice heralded the end of the U.S.–European open skies era by 
ruling that portions of these aviation agreements violated applicable E.U. law. As a consequence, 
the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportation have attempted to agree on 
a new regulatory regime for travel within and between the United States and Europe. The so-called 
Open Aviation Area aims at liberalizing United States, European, and trans-Atlantic air traffic to the 
fullest extent possible. As a result, the aviation industry may become more efficient and competitive, 
provide consumers with better service and, in many instances, lower fares.
Conflicting interests have hindered the successful conclusion of an agreement. The United 
Kingdom and British airlines are reluctant to open London Heathrow to additional foreign airlines. 
Improved access to London Heathrow, however, is what is demanded by some U.S. airlines in return 
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for allowing additional access to the United States by European carriers. These U.S. airlines are 
joined by strong protectionist forces within the United States —most notably labor organizations 
and numerous Congressmen—who oppose changes to U.S. foreign ownership rules and, thus, the 
idea of a truly liberalized U.S.–E.U. Open Aviation Area. Negotiations have come to a halt until the 
foreign ownership issue is resolved. This may not happen anytime soon as lengthy legal procedures 
within the United States loom. The Europeans, in turn, seem determined not to concede ground and 
sign any agreement until the reciprocity condition with respect to foreign ownership is met.
Security and labor concerns dominate the U.S. foreign ownership debate. More specifically, 
a relaxation of foreign ownership rules will likely only be achieved if the viability of the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a vital component of U.S. military operations, can be ascertained. 
While one may argue that foreign-owned U.S. airlines would not forego high-volume, high-margin 
military business, critics will only be appeased once an appropriate legal regime governing airline 
participation in the CRAF program is defined. Second, labor issues must be addressed. Independent 
studies (e.g., Moselle et al. 2002) have not found evidence for negative employment effects, as 
purported by various labor organizations, but concerns regarding conflicting labor laws and potential 
legal loopholes, as well as open questions regarding labor relations (e.g., union representation and 
collective bargaining), must be addressed.
A truly liberalized U.S.–European Open Aviation Area may still be far in the future. In the 
meantime, it is conceivable that the United States and the European Union will settle on an interim 
solution that partially deregulates transatlantic traffic (perhaps, with the exception of London route 
markets), but excludes the issues of cabotage and foreign ownership. An alternative to full cabotage 
suggested by Warden (2003) involves trading domestic routes. Under this scenario, the United States 
would grant European airlines the right to operate a specific route in the United States in exchange 
for access to a specific intra-European route market.  Havel (2003), in turn, suggests “experimenting” 
with the air cargo industry first to better understand the effects of deregulation before opening the 
U.S.–E.U. Open Aviation Area to passenger operations. Some form of interim solution may be in 
place as early as mid-2007 according to some analysts. A full-fledged liberalization of the U.S.–E.U. 
aviation market remains a more distant goal.
Endnotes
1.  See www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2005-10-12-02.htm
2.  Fifth freedom rights enable an airline to transport passengers from a country other than the 
airline’s home country to a third country on routes originating or ending in the home country.
3. Third and fourth freedom rights enable an airline to transport passengers and cargo from the 
airline’s home country to another country and vice-versa.
4. As of July 2006, the following countries are member states of the European Union with bilateral 
U.S. open skies agreements (the dates in parentheses indicate the year in which the respective 
open skies agreements were concluded): Netherlands (1992), Belgium (1995), Finland (1995), 
Denmark (1995), Sweden (1995), Luxembourg (1995), Austria (1995), Czech Republic (1995), 
Germany (1996), Italy (1998), Portugal (1999), Slovakia (2000), Malta (2000), Poland (2001), 
France (2001).
5. The Bermuda II agreement establishes that only two U.S. airlines (American Airlines, United 
Airlines) and two British airlines (British Airways, Virgin Atlantic) may offer services between 
London’s Heathrow airport and a restrictive set of U.S. airports (Baltimore-Washington, Boston, 
Chicago [O’Hare], Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York [John F. Kennedy], Newark, 
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Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington [Dulles]). Further limitations 
are imposed with regard to air services to or from other London airports, airline pricing, and the 
number of route markets served.
6.  Highly restrictive agreements between the United States and Greece, Ireland, and Spain, 
respectively, are in place.
7.  The term cabotage refers to the transport of passengers and cargo wholly within a country other 
than the carrier’s home country.
8. The ruling was rendered on November 5, 2002.
9.  Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Forum on Air and Space Law, Hollywood, Florida, 
November 8, 2002.
10. See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international/dev_en.htm.
11. Subject only to extant antitrust and cartel regulations.
12. These numbers represent estimated gains in consumer surplus that do not offset air carrier 
profits.
13. U.S. legislation restricts foreign ownership of U.S. airlines to 25% of the voting stock and 49% 
of non-voting stock.
14. The term double marginalization refers to instances where firms charge suboptimal prices to the 
end customer due to a lack of inter-firm price coordination. Such suboptimal prices may come 
about when firms successively add profit margins to a product’s price as it moves along the 
supply chain. Higher prices negatively affect customer demand and have been shown to reduce 
the total producer surplus earned.
15. This number is a specific estimate of welfare gains for the year 1981.
16. This agreement was reached on November 18, 2005.
17. If foreign airlines could acquire or found a U.S.-based airline, that airline could naturally offer 
U.S. domestic services.
18. In addition, the president and two thirds of the board of directors must be American citizens.
19. Integration through mergers, takeovers, and share swaps, for example.
20. The U.S. military spent $2 billion on transportation services provided by commercial airlines 
during the 2003 conflict in Iraq alone.
21. Dubai Ports World bought control of British P&O but was later forced to sell P&O’s six U.S. 
container terminals.
22. See www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2005-10-12-02.htm.
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23. Excluding compensation payments for losses following the events of September 11 2001.
24. Labor organizations that oppose changes to foreign ownership regulations include the Air Line 
Pilots Association, the Independent Pilots Association, and the Allied Pilots Association.
25. The Department of Transportation is charged with enforcing foreign ownership rules in the 
U.S. airline industry and ensuring that U.S. citizens are in “actual control” of U.S. airlines. The 
NPRM aims at redefining the meaning of “actual control.” 
26. The DOT NPRM can be accessed online at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf93/ 368719_
web.pdf.
27. The proposed bill is identified by the following code: H.R. 4542.
28. The proposed bill is identified by the following code: S.2135.
29. The committee voted 19-6 on July 20, 2006.
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Appendix - Economic Effects of Air Transport Liberalization
Figure 1 summarizes the results of the processes triggered by the signing of an open skies agreement 
and presents an economic perspective of expected consumer and producer benefits:
Figure 1: An Illustration of the Economic Effects of Air Traffic Liberalization
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The left part of Figure 1 illustrates the situation before liberalization occurs. S1 indicates the supply 
function and D1 indicates the downward-sloping consumer demand. The vertical dashed line (C) 
represents a capacity constraint imposed by regulatory restrictions; for example the limitation on air 
services between the United States and London Heathrow. In this scenario, the equilibrium quantity, 
i.e., the number of passengers, is equal to Q1 and the equilibrium price is P1. The areas denoted 
CS1 and PS1 mark the consumer surplus and producer surplus, respectively. Note that imposing the 
capacity constraint prevents the market from reaching the optimal equilibrium (Q1*/P1*) and leads 
to welfare loss L1. Deregulation results in the abolition of capacity constraints, potentially leading 
to lower production costs and increased consumer demand. The right part of the Figure 1 visualizes 
these changes by presenting shifted supply (S2) and demand curves (D2). The new equilibrium 
is identified by quantity Q2 and price P2. The resulting welfare gains are readily apparent. Social 
welfare clearly increases, with consumers likely benefiting the most. The effect on total producer 
surplus is uncertain as profits from efficiency gains may be eroded by added competition and lower 
prices. While total producer surplus may not change dramatically, it has been suggested that larger, 
efficient firms and alliances will gain substantially (Button 2002). Moselle et al. (see Table 6 in 
Moselle et al. 2002) estimate that total consumer surplus may increase by approximately 5.1 billion 
Euros due to the OAA. Cost efficiencies, pricing synergies, and the abolition of capacity constraints 
on the transatlantic market account for more than half of this increase. The remainder, about 46%, 
is credited to cost savings in the intra-European market.
